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Migration and Human Capital: 
Self-Selection of Indentured Servants
to the Americas 
RAN ABRAMITZKY AND FABIO BRAGGION
When contracting, European merchants could at least partially observe character-
istics such as the health, physical strength, and education of indentured servants. 
These characteristics, unobservable to us, were likely to influence servitude dura-
tion, which is observable to us. We employ a switching regression model to ana-
lyze 2,066 servitude contracts from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
Servants were positively selected to American mainland colonies in terms of their 
unobservable human capital and negatively selected to the West Indies. Thus, the 
relative quality of migrants’ human capital may have played a role in the subse-
quent relative economic performance of these regions. 
hroughout the colonial period, indentured servitude was an impor-
tant form of white migration to the New World. Abbot Emerson 
Smith and Farley Grubb suggested that roughly half of the white immi-
grants who arrived to the American colonies used indentured servitude 
contracts.
1
 These contracts, under which emigrants would become servants 
in the colonies, enabled them to finance their trip to the New World.
 We focus on servitude migration and examine whether the mainland 
and the West Indian colonies attracted migrants with different endow-
ments of human capital as early as the seventeenth and eighteenth cen-
turies. Although the literature looks at the characteristics of servants 
bound for various colonies as they appear in the surviving records, most 
aspects of servants’ human capital such as education, experience, 
health, and physical strength are not currently observable and, thus, 
were not analyzed.
2
 We infer these unobservable aspects of human capi-
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1 Smith, Colonists; and Grubb, “Incidence.” 
2 Galenson, White Servitude, pp. 91–96. Servants’ ability or inability to sign his contract was 
recorded, but this is a rough measure of education. 
T
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tal by noting that they could be observed at the time of contracting and 
were likely to influence servitude duration, which is observable to us. 
We can therefore econometrically test the relations between unobserv-
able characteristics affecting the servitude duration and destination 
choices.
 More specifically, migrants who were expected by the European mer-
chants to be more productive received shorter terms of servitude.
3
 Al-
though migrants had choice and so selected themselves to a destination, 
the duration of the servant contracts offered by merchants per migrant 
characteristics for different destinations influenced the migrants’ choice. 
Thus, to the extent that individuals who migrated to a certain colonial 
destination persistently received shorter terms of servitude than their 
observable characteristics imply, we conclude that they were positively 
selected in terms of characteristics that are currently unobservable.
4
 Mi-
grants who had to serve a longer term than their observable characteris-
tics imply were negatively selected. 
 Following David Galenson, we restrict our sample to nonadult ser-
vants because of uncertainty over the role that unrecorded cash pay-
ments may have played in altering adult servant contract duration.
5
 We 
analyze two important collections of English registrations of indentured 
servants, the two for which enough detailed information has survived to 
allow our econometric analysis, namely the indentures of 162 contracts 
from Middlesex County between 1682 and 1685 and the indentures of 
1904 contracts from London between 1718 and 1759. 
 We employ a switching regression model (type five tobit) and esti-
mate the length of servitude expected by an individual with certain 
characteristics in both the mainland and the West Indian islands, taking 
into account the endogeneity of that individual’s migration decision.
6
Migrants are assumed to choose their colonial destination based on fac-
tors such as their age, gender, literacy, county of origin and the length 
of the contract expected in each location, which is itself a function of 
individual’s observable and unobservable characteristics. 
 We find that servants bound to the West Indies were negatively se-
lected in the sense that, ceteris paribus, they served half a year more 
3 Galenson, “Market Evaluation” and White Servitude; and Grubb, “Auction.” 
4 On the self selection of migrants, see, for example, Borjas, “Self Selection” and “Econom-
ics”; and Chiswick, “Is the New Imigration” and “Are Immigrants.” 
5 According to Galenson, White Servitude, the full conditions of the contract for young ser-
vants were recorded and the duration of servitude appears to be the main variable. For adult ser-
vants, cash payments at the end of the term were an important contractual clause, but they were 
rarely recorded. 
6 The colonial destination was a major choice variable of prospective servants, Pitman, De-
velopment; Smith, Colonists; Galenson, “Market Evaluation” and White Servitude; and Sheri-
dan, Sugar.
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than predicted by their observable characteristics. Conversely, servants 
migrating to the mainland were positively selected in the sense that they 
had to serve over half a year less than predicted by their observable 
characteristics. Notably, the regression analysis suggests that servants’ 
characteristics that are currently unobservable were more important de-
terminants of servitude duration than observable characteristics such as 
occupation, literacy, and gender. 
 The nature of human capital selection of immigrants to the Carib-
bean islands and to what later became the United States may suggest 
the importance of human capital in their subsequent distinct eco-
nomic development. Despite a higher initial income per capita in the 
islands compared to the mainland, by the nineteenth century the 
United States was well on its trajectory of sustained economic 
growth while the Caribbean islands lagged far behind. Economists 
and economic historians have explored the role of factor endowments 
and initial distinct institutions in explaining this divergence.
7
 The 
finding of this article reveals that the colonies in these regions had, 
early on, attracted migrants with different endowment of human capi-
tal. To the extent that the destination selectivity by human capital that 
we found here can be generalized to other migrants, then this sug-
gests the potential importance of the relative quality of migrants’ 
human capital in the subsequent relative economic performance of 
these regions.
8
 In finding that, this article lends support to the work 
of Edward Glaeser, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Andrei Shleifer that suggests that the different human capital brought 
by immigrants to the New World may have been important in the 
subsequent development of good institutions and economic develop-
ment.
9
 It may nevertheless be the case that the selection we find re-
flects distinct geographical endowments. 
“UNOBSERVABLE” DETERMINANTS OF SERVITUDE DURATION 
 Our main argument relies on the presence of servants’ characteristics 
unobservable to researchers now but observable to and rewarded by the 
7 For example, Engerman and Sokoloff, How Latin America and “Colonialism”; Acemoglu, 
Johnson, and Robinson, “Colonial Origins” and “Reversal”; and Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson 
and Thaicharoen, “Institutional Causes.”  
8 For the impact of human capital on economic growth, see, for example, Becker, Murphy, 
and Tamura, “Human Capital”; Galor and Weil. “Population”; Lucas, “On the Mechanism”; and 
Mankiw, Romer and Weil, “Contribution.” Schultz, “Value,” emphasizes the role of human 
capital in the efficiency of reallocation of resources after economic shocks. Shastry and Weil, 
“How Much”; and Weil, “Accounting for the Effect,” show the importance of health in the cross 
country variation of income. Becker, Murphy, and Tamura, “Human Capital.” 
9 Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, “Do Institutions.” 
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European merchants who shipped the servants to the New World and 
sold their contracts once there. In what follows, we describe these char-
acteristics and outline their potential importance in determining servi-
tude duration. 
 First, healthier and stronger servants may have received shorter terms 
of servitude, as they were better suited to the physically demanding 
work of growing, processing, and transporting the sugar, tobacco, or 
rice; packing and shipping the staple; building houses and farm sheds; 
and so on. Besides, the stronger and healthier were more likely to sur-
vive the long and exhausting trip to the Americas. Thus, servants de-
termined by the merchants to be healthy and strong are expected to have 
received a shorter length of servitude in the colonies. 
 Health and physical strength are not observable to us today but were 
to some extent observable by European merchants and American plant-
ers. Grubb considers convict servants and constructs a proxy of physical 
strength and health by using servants’ heights.
10
 He finds that the price 
of convict servants in the auctions of Maryland between 1767 and 1775 
was 20 percent higher for exceptionally tall servants concluding that the 
higher price was the result of planters’ concern about servant’ physical 
conditions.
11
 Grubb’s finding is also confirmed by anecdotal evidence. 
There is evidence that planters walked among convict servants arriving 
to the ports, inquiring their trade, examining them like horses and inter-
viewing them.
12
 When a servant named John Lauson was asked for his 
trade, he answered that he was a cooper. The planter replied that “That 
will not do for him” and continued the interview. Lauson later recalled 
that:
13
Some felt our hands other our legs and feet, 
And made us walk to see were compleat 
Some view’d out Teeth to see if they was good, 
And fit to Chaw our hard and homely food 
The health of servants was the main concern of merchants and planters. 
As reported by Bernard Bailyn: 
10 Grubb, “Market Evaluation.” Data on servants’ heights are not indicated in the available in-
formation on voluntary servants used in this work. 
11 Grubb defines exceptionally tall servants as those servants whose height was one standard 
deviation above the average height of male British convict servants in Maryland between 1767 
and 1775. The secular and cross-sectional differences in human heights have been used by eco-
nomic historians as measures of nutritional quality, physical strength, and well-being of indi-
viduals. See Steckel, “Stature.” 
12 Lauson, Felon’s Account, p. 8. 
13 Ibid. 
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the dominant concern is clear in the pages of the merchants’ letter books. The 
seller [of servants] were haunted, above all else, by the fear of disease. Every-
thing depended on the health of their charges, which was unpredictable and un-
controllable.14
Moreover:
the first concern, at the receiving end of the process as at the sending, was thus 
always health: the best markets were for the “young, healthy, and not de-
formed”—a concern reflected in innumerable newspaper advertisements an-
nouncing the recent arrival and pending sale of “healthy servants—men, women, 
and boys.” Only slightly less weighty was the stress on occupations and skills.15
 Second, correspondence between merchants and planters suggest that 
planters were looking for servants who were laborious and industrious 
men, characteristics which merchants could potentially detect but are un-
observable to the econometrician.
16
 By the late seventeenth century and 
eighteenth century, planters increasingly requested servants who not only 
possessed a skill, but had good character and were good in their profes-
sion, which are again characteristics that cannot be observed today. Thus, 
in 1732, a Glasgow merchant wrote to a correspondent to send tradesmen 
to servitude, but be sure that none but good tradesmen be indentured.
17
Similarly, a Bristol merchant was advised by Samuel Martin in 1757 to 
send him “A good jobbing Sadler & Collar maker who understands tan-
ning & dressing leather for his own use” or “A sober Jockey who is a 
good rider & breaker of young horses. Of this man you must insist upon a 
good Character for Sobriety & skill in his profession; because generally 
speaking they are a drunken profligate breed of people.”
18
 Whether a servant was indeed skilled in his profession could be eas-
ily detected by planters, thus it made sense for the merchant to verify 
servants’ qualities as best as he could. A planter from Virginia who 
found out that he was misled by a servant, wrote in his diary in 1758:
19
Sent home the fellow sent here for a gardiner. He knows nothing of the matter. 
Plowman . . . I keep. He seems a workman and willing fellow. 
Third, characteristics such as education, skill, ability, entrepreneurial 
and managerial skills are important determinants of individuals’ produc-
14 Bailyn, Voyagers, p. 330. 
15 Bailyn, Voyagers, pp. 330–31. 
16 Christopher Jeaffreson writing to his London merchant in 1677; quoted in Galenson, White
Servitude, p. 134. 
17 Quoted in Galenson, White Servitude, p. 135. 
18 Quoted in Galenson, White Servitude, p. 136. 
19 Quoted in Galenson, White Servitude, p. 137. 
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tivity, and thus potentially important determinants of servitude duration. 
These characteristics probably gained importance over time. By the late 
seventeenth century, the demand for skilled servants increased and ser-
vants were often employed as slave supervisors, which meant that ser-
vant’s qualities such as high ability, ambition, and managerial skills 
must have been sought for and rewarded by shorter length of servitude. 
Once again, merchants who dealt with the trade of servants had an in-
centive to identify such qualities. 
 Even the observable surviving measures of skill and experience are 
rough and incomplete. The merchants, by inspecting, examining and in-
terviewing prospective servants, must have had a better sense of the 
education of a prospective servant than indicated by his ability to sign. 
Similarly, work experience must have been conveyed better from ser-
vants to merchants than is captured by a servant’s age, which is the only 
indication for experience available in the registrations. A servant’s oc-
cupation, observable to us today, may indicate his skill, but we cannot 
see how good a carpenter, or cooper, or shoemaker he was. We also 
cannot observe how motivated and ambitious he was, and we cannot 
asses from the surviving data his ability to supervise slaves. The mer-
chants must have been able to evaluate a servant’s productivity better. 
A MODEL OF DESTINATION CHOICE 
 Unlike African slaves, many Europeans migrated voluntarily in the 
hope of improving their lives. For those who financed the trip using the 
indentured contract, a main contractual clause was the colonial destina-
tion. Abott Smith noted that: 
. . . most striking of all evidences is that which shows servants preferring one 
colony over another . . . in one way or another, whether by published literature 
or by word of mouth, a certain amount of sound knowledge and honest opinion 
got about among prospective emigrants concerning the relative excellencies of 
various colonies.20
Based on his characteristics, each prospective servant could compare the 
conditions of the indentured contract in each colony and the expected 
prospects of various colonies, and choose his preferred destination. In our 
main analysis, prospective servants are assumed to choose between serv-
ing in a mainland colony and serving in a West Indian colony.
21
20 Smith, Colonists, pp. 57–58. 
21 A second specifications allow servants to have three choices, namely mainland southern 
colonies, mainland northern colonies, and the West Indies. Because the results are very similar 
and for ease of presentation, we present here only the binary choice model. Results from the 
three-choice specification are available from the authors upon request. 
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 Formally, we employ a switching regression model (type five tobit) 
that allows for two regimes (in our case migrate to the American 
mainland or migrate to the West Indies), a criterion function (a migra-
tion rule that determines the regime) and two regression equations de-
scribing the length of the servitude determination in the mainland and in 
the West Indies. This framework has been used to study migration, re-
turns to schooling, and the way joining unions effects wages.
22
 Assume that an individual chooses his colonial destination, *iD ,
based on the difference between the servitude length in the mainland 
and the West Indies, LiA – LiWI, as well as other individual characteris-
tics that may affect one’s taste for location, Zi
iiWIiAii uLLZD ][21  (1) 
where E(ui) = 0 and var(ui) is normalized to one without loss of general-
ity. For every person, we either observe the length of the servitude in 
the mainland LiA if the servant migrated to the American mainland or 
the length of servitude in the West Indies LiWI if he migrated to the West 
Indies. We do not observe the counterfactual length of term that a mi-
grant to, say, the mainland would have served had he chosen the West 
Indies colonies instead. Note, however, that the length of the servitude 
reflects a servant’s expected productivity, which can be written as a 
function of his observable personal characteristics Xi affecting expected 
productivity
ijijij XL  (2) 
where j = WI,A and E( ij) = 0 j,  var( iA) =
2
2 , var( iWI) =
2
3 .
Thus, if we can estimate the parameters A  and WI , then given a ser-
vant’s set of characteristics Xi, we can predict the length of the servitude 
in the mainland (West Indies) for actual migrants to the mainland (West 
Indies) as well the counterfactual length of servitude in the mainland 
(West Indies) for those who migrated to the West Indies (mainland). 
 An important fact to note is that actual migrants may not constitute a 
random sample, so that )1()1( DEXDLE iAi
'
AA  and 
)0()0( DEXDLE iWIi
'
WIWI  and an OLS regression 
might produce biased estimators. The terms E ( iA D = 1) and  
22 On migration, see Robinson and Tomes, “Self-Selection”; and Ferrie, Yankeys. On returns 
to schooling, see Willis and Rosen, “Education.” On unions and wages, see Lee, “Unionism.” 
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E( iWI  D = 0) captures migrants’ characteristics unobservable to the 
econometrician that are persistently correlated with the length of servi-
tude. For instance, stronger and healthier individuals could choose to 
migrate to the mainland, and merchants potentially rewarded their 
strength and health with a shorter term of servitude. The econometri-
cian, not being able to observe strength and health, will omit an impor-
tant variable from his OLS regression and produce biased estimators. 
To properly estimate the model requires correcting the estimation for 
possible self-selection. 
 Intuitively, the econometrician can check whether servants’ unob-
servable characteristics from their migration decision are correlated 
with the duration of servitude. If the unobservable characteristics from 
the migration decision are consistently associated with a longer duration 
of servitude, then migrants are negatively selected (e.g., they are weaker 
and less healthy). If, on the other hand, the unobservable characteristics 
from the migration decision are consistently associated with a shorter 
duration of servitude, then migrants are positively selected (e.g., they 
are stronger and healthier). 
 Formally, the servant’s decision rule iD is unobservable, but his 

















where Wi is observable and contains all the elements of X and Z.
23
 To 
capture the dependence between individuals’ migration decisions and 
their duration of servitude, and assuming that ( i, iA, iWI) are distributed 














XDLE  (4) 
23 We are presenting a switching regression model, with endogenous switch, Maddala, Lim-
ited Dependent and Qualitative Variables, p. 223. Although the distributional assumptions used 
in the analysis are standard, they are strong and might have substantial effect on the estimation. 
Heckman, “Varieties”; Manski, “Nonparametric Bounds”; and Newey, Powell, and Walker, 
“Semiparametric Estimation.” 
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 is the inverse mill ratio.
25










  is the 
magnitude of the self-selection of migrants to the West Indies, i.e., it is 
the magnitude of the effect of unobservable (to us today) characteristics 
of migrants to the West Indies on their servitude duration.
26
 Notice the difference between compensating differentials across colo-
nies and servants’ selection to the different colonies. The compensating 
differentials reflect differences in the quality of various colonies and are 
captured by the difference in the constants (between the mainland and 
West Indies) of regression. The servants’ selection reflects differences 
in the quality of servants bound to the different colonies and is captured 




















  for 
the mainland. 
 The vector X includes individual characteristics thought to influence 
the length of servitude in the colonies: age, ability to sign, gender, oc-
cupation and the season when the contract was signed. The elements of 
Z include age, ability to sign, gender and the servants’ county of origin 
(see Appendix A for the definitions of counties). The parameters are 
identified under the restrictions imposed by the model.
27
 To identify 1
and 2, there must be at least one variable in X not in Z and vice versa. 
Both conditions are satisfied: Z includes variable not included in X—the
county of origin, and X includes variables not in Z—the season of de-
parture and the occupation category, which are assumed to affect the 
25 We are adopting here an identification assumption traditionally used in the literature of self 
selection (see Heckman and Sedlaceck, “Heterogeneity”): the proportionality assumption. Dif-
ferences in the evaluation of unobservable characteristics between locations are captured in the 
constant term of the regression. Therefore, the coefficient on the inverse mill ratio just captures 
a pure supply effects determined by the relative capabilities of servants arriving to the colonies, 
and does not reflect different evaluation of unobservable characteristics in different markets. 























 represents the magni-
tude of the self selection of migrants to the mainland. 
27 Note that the reduced form Probit (column 1 of Table 1 and Table 2) and the servitude du-
ration equations (columns 3 and 4 in Table 1 and Table 2) are not affected by the exclusion re-
strictions of X and Z. However, the estimation of the structural Probit (column 2 of Table 1 and 
Table 2) does depend on the exclusion restrictions, which are required for identification. Under 
the exclusion restriction, a variable in X that is not in Z, such as the occupation variable, is in-
terpreted as having an effect on the destination choice only through its effect on the servitude 
duration, but no direct effect on the destination choice. 
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migration decision only through their effect on the servitude duration. 
Several works show pattern of chain migration from a certain British 
area to a certain colonial region: we therefore find reasonable that 
county of origins was a strong determinant of the destination choice.
28
On the other hand, there is no reason to believe that just being from a 
certain county would have had an independent and separate effect on 
contracts’ length. We rely on the work by Grubb and Tony Stitt to con-
clude that season of departure affected the period of servitude rather 
than destination choice.
29
 Similarly, Smith and Galenson show that cer-
tain types of occupations were appreciated by colonial planters and po-
tentially they could have received better terms of servitude.
30
 The structural parameters of the binomial model were estimated via a 
three-step procedure.
31
 First, the reduced form equation is estimated by 
Probit maximum likelihood estimation to find ˆ . Then, using ˆ , we ob-








tion (for both the West Indies and the mainland) is estimated by OLS. 









 and get 
'
A
ˆ  and LiA. Third, equipped with LiA and LiWI, we estimate the structural 
decision equation to find the determinants of colonial choice, and de-
termine whether or not migrants were expecting shorter servitude in 
their destination choice.
32
THE DATA SETS 
 Our data sources are the two most important and informative surviv-
ing lists of servants registrations from the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries.
33
 The first is a list of 823 servants recorded in Middlesex 
28 Bailyn, Voyagers; and Horn, “‘To Parts’” and Adapting to a New World.
29 Grubb and Stitt, “Liverpool Emigrant Servant Trade,” computed correlations between co-
lonial destinations and month of departure and did not find any clear pattern. 
30 Smith, Colonists; and Galenson, White Servitude.
31 See Maddala, Limited Dependent and Qualitative Variables, pp. 223–28; and Amemiya, 
Advanced Econometrics, pp. 399–402. 
32 The standard errors of the coefficients have been corrected (using bootstrap method with 
1,000 repetitions) for the fact that the regressor is an estimated, rather than observed, value. 
33 Four other collections of servants recorded in Bristol (1654–1686), London (1683–1686, 
1773–1775), and Liverpool (1697–1707) survived, but they lack information that is crucial to 
our analysis, as variables such as age, literacy, occupation, and the servitude duration were often 
not recorded. The Bristol Collection is transcribed in Coldham, Bristol Registers. The London 
collection is reported by Ghirelli, List; and the Liverpool register is reported by French, List.
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County between 1682 and 1684.
34
 The second is a list of 3,182 servants 
recorded in London between 1718 and 1759.
35
 Both lists contain de-
tailed information of the servitude contract, including the name, date of 
departure, gender, age, occupation, ability to sign, county of origin, co-
lonial destination, recruiter’s name, and length of servitude, that allow 
us to analyze prospective servants’ migration decisions and the deter-
minants of the servitude duration. 
 Our analysis is more meaningful when the full terms of the contract 
were recorded and when the length of servitude, rather than cash payments, 
was the main contractual clause. According to Galenson, this was not the 
case for adult servants, i.e., those over 21 years old, but was the case for 
minor servants.
36
 More specifically, for adult servants, cash payments were 
probably the main contractual clause but unfortunately, they were rarely 
recorded for adults. There is little variation in the length of servitude in 
adult contracts and four years of servitude appears to have been the norm.
37
For minor servants, on the other hand, cash payments were consistently re-
corded but were rarely made. The length of servitude was the main source 
of variation in the contracts of minor servants. Thus, our analysis focuses 
on minors, which leaves us with 162 observations in the Middlesex sam-
ple, out of which 86 individuals migrated to the mainland and 76 to the 
West Indies, and 1,904 observations in the London sample, out of which 
1,087 moved to the mainland and 817 to the West Indies. 
 There is substantial amount of missing information in these records, 
most of which is occupation information. More than half of the minors 
did not have a recorded occupation. There is a debate regarding the in-
terpretation of missing recorded occupations.
38
 Whereas Mildred 
Campbell argues that servants with missing occupation constituted a 
random sample of the servant population, Galenson holds that those 
without recorded occupation indeed did not have any professional 
34 The data on servants who left from the port of the Middlesex county, 1682–1684, were re-
trieved from microfilms of the original indenture records entitled Plantation Indentures and cre-
ated by the London Metropolitan Archives. The original records can be found in the Middlesex 
Guildhall, in the United Kingdom, and they are also reported in Nicholson, Some Early Emi-
grants; and Wareing, “Some Early Emigrants.” 
35 The data used for servants who departed from London, 1718–1759 come from microfilms 
of the original records, entitled Agreements to Serve in America and can be found at the Guild-
hall, London. This source was transcribed by Kaminkow and Kaminkow, List; and Galenson, 
“Agreements.” 
36 Galenson, White Servitude.
37 Galenson, White Servitude, found that for minors, cash payments were recorded when 
made (in fewer than 6 percent of the contracts) and were almost always made to servants bound 
for four years. Because most adults were bound to serve for four years and because adults rarely 
appear to have served less than four years, Galenson concluded that for adults cash payments 
substituted for reduction of servitude below four years. 
38 See Galenson, White Servitude, pp. 39–64, for a detailed discussion. 
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skill.
39
 We consider two specifications, one of which excludes the occu-
pation variable from the analysis, and the other treats missing occupa-
tion as if the servant had no occupation. We report results from the lat-




 Our estimation results are presented in Table 1 for the Middlesex 
sample of 1682–1684 and in Table 2 for the London sample of 1718–
1759. The estimation results of the determinants-of-migration equations 
are presented in the first and second columns of both tables.
41
 The first 
column of Tables 1 and 2 shows results from the reduced-form Probit 
regression (D = 1 if Wi + i  0 and D = 0 otherwise), where the choice 
of destination is determined by individuals’ observable characteristics 
Wi that contain both variables in Xi and in Zi, as well as by individuals’ 
unobservable characteristics i. The second column of Tables 1 and 2 
shows results from the structural Probit (D = 1 if *iD = 1Zi + 2[LiA – 
LiWI] + ui  0 and D = 0 otherwise), where the choice of destination is 
determined by individuals’ observable characteristics Zi, as well as by 
the difference in expected duration of servitude in each destination and 
an unobservable component ui. The results from estimating the servi-
tude duration equations in the mainland and in the West Indies are pre-
sented in the third and fourth columns, respectively. 
Migrants’ Selection to Colonial America 
 John Riley was nineteen years old when he left Britain in the summer 
of 1722 to St. Christopher in the West Indies. He signed his indentured 
contract with a merchant named Christopher Veale from Shoreditch, 
Middlesex. Riley did not have a recorded occupation, but he could sign 
his indenture contract. Given Riley’s observable characteristics (gender, 
age, occupation, literacy, and season of departure), our model predicts 
that he should have served in the West Indies for a little over three and a 
half years. However, Riley’s indentured contract assigned him five 
years of servitude, indicating that some factors that are unobservable to 
us prolonged his period of servitude. 
 Had Riley gone to the mainland, our model predicts that he would 
have served an even longer term, which reflects compensating differentials 
39 Campbell, “Social Origins.” 
40 Results from the second specification are available from the authors upon request. 
41 Description of the variables is reported in the Appendix. 
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TABLE 1
MIDDLESEX SAMPLE: ESTIMATION RESULTS











Constant   9.023** 16.97***
(3.902) (1.41)
LUS – LWI  –0.456   
(0.500)
Age  –0.083** –0.202*** –0.245 –0.515*** 
 (0.035) (0.033) (0.182) (0.058) 
Ability to sign  –0.042 –0.086 –0.211 –0.391** 
 (0.103) (0.101) (0.172) (0.188) 
Gender  –0.114 0.019 –0.192 –0.495** 
 (0.241) (0.192) (0.197) (0.239) 
County of origin      
 Northern  –0.184 –0.039   
 (0.164) (0.156)   
 North central  –0.129 –0.020   
 (0.186) (0.158)   
 Western  –0.073 0.112   
 (0.205) (0.149)   
 Southern  –0.105 0.037   
(0.182) (0.160)
Season of departure      
 Fall or winter  0.087  0.402** –0.684 
 (0.119)  (0.153) (0.541) 
 Summer  0.702***  0.153 –1.693** 
 (0.066)  (1.257) (0.817) 
“Skilled” occupation  0.443**  –0.042 –0.599 
 (0.086)  (0.535) (0.411) 
No occupation  0.322**  0.223 –0.086 
 (0.126)  (0.283) (0.236) 
Mill ratio    0.009 –0.935* 
(0.801) (0.482)
R2   0.35 0.71
LR chi2 88.33 66.67   
N  162 162 76 86 
Note: For variable definitions, see the Appendix. 
between the mainland and the West Indies. At the same time, William 
Tayler possessed the same observable characteristics as Riley, and he 
left Britain in the same summer as Riley and even signed his contract 
with the same merchant (Christopher Veale). Tayler headed to Mary-
land and was assigned to serve there for only four years. Although 
Tayler and Riley possessed the same observable characteristics, Tayler 
had unobservable characteristics such as health or physical strength that 
shortened his servitude whereas Riley had unobservable characteristics 
that prolonged his servitude. 
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TABLE 2
LONDON SAMPLE: ESTIMATION RESULTS 











Constant   9.862*** 11.589*** 
(0.576) (0.322)
LUS – LWI  0.054   
(0.098)
Age  –0.029*** –0.036*** –0.323*** –0.332*** 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.021) (0.021) 
Ability to sign  –0.084*** –0.079*** –0.006 –0.082 
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.065) (0.068) 
Gender  0.178*** 0.199*** –0.130 –0.269** 
 (0.045) (0.048) (0.165) (0.136) 
County of origin      
 Northern  –0.135*** –0.136***   
 (0.040) (0.039)   
 North central  –0.071* –0.070***   
 (0.045) (0.044)   
 Western  0.011 0.007   
 (0.044) (0.043)   
 Southern  0.044 0.032   
(0.037) (0.037)
 Scotland  –0.177*** –0.186***   
 (0.056) (0.056)   
 Ireland  0.012 0.019   
(0.078) (0.079)
Season of departure      
 Winter  –0.037  0.038 0.152* 
 (0.041)  (0.095) (0.089) 
 Fall  –0.171***  0.139 0.245** 
 (0.039)  (0.107) (0.115) 
 Summer  –0.110***  –0.060 –0.003 
 (0.041)  (0.101) (0.103) 
“Skilled” occupation  0.088***  –0.092 –0.218** 
 (0.034)  (0.077) (0.097) 
No occupation  0.013***  –0.021 0.150 
 (0.030)  (0.076) (0.094) 
Mill ratio    0.553** –0.903*** 
(0.237) (0.320)
R2   0.39 0.44
LR chi2 143.53 100.77   
N  1,904 1,904 817 1,087 
Note: For variable definitions, see the Appendix. 
 We now turn to the regression analysis that formalizes and general-
izes these examples. As shown in the third and fourth columns of both 
samples, the coefficients on the inverse Mill ratio are positive and big 
for servants bound to the West Indies in the latter sample and negative 
and big for servants bound to the mainland in both samples. These re-
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sults indicate that servants migrating to the West Indies were negatively 
selected and servants migrating to mainland colonies were positively se-
lected.
42
 More specifically, our estimation suggests that in both the sev-
enteenth and eighteenth centuries, an average servant who migrated to 
the mainland served about half a year less than predicted by his observ-
able characteristics. A servant bound to the West Indies in the eight-
eenth century served half a year more than his observable personal 
characteristics would indicate.
43
 The difference in the constant terms suggests that, when abstracting 
from personal characteristics, servitude was shorter in the West Indies 
than in the mainland. This reflects the higher general desirability of the 
mainland over the West Indies. The positive and negative coefficients 
on the Mill ratios (columns 3 and 4) imply that, abstracting from the 
compensating differentials, there was a negative selection of servants to 
the West Indies and a positive selection to the mainland.
44
 The strong selection effects imply that in the seventeenth and eight-
eenth centuries, people who were of higher quality—as observed by 
their contemporaries but not by us—preferred mainland destinations 
over the West Indies colonies and that those who had lower unobserv-
able qualities were more likely to migrate to the West Indies. These 
findings are consistent with the historical evidence, which highlighted 
the fact that migrants to the West Indies were “lazy useless sort of peo-
ple . . . ,” and that mainland colonies offered more attractive opportuni-
ties for talented servants than did West Indies destinations.
45
42 When allowing a servant to choose between northern and southern colonies in the 
mainland, positive selection of servants to southern colonies such as Virginia and Maryland ap-
pears to be stronger compared to northern colonies. Moreover, the results are robust to the in-
clusion of the price of sugar in England. 
43 Moreover, we find that the unobservable characteristics varied with gender and literacy. In 







 is, on average, bigger for men than for women) in both the United States and the 
West Indies. For example, whereas an average men served in the mainland seven months less 
than his observable characteristics indicate, women only served four months less than suggested 
by their characteristics. In the West Indies, men served five months longer than suggested by 
their observable characteristics, compared to seven months for women. Similarly, literate indi-
viduals seem to have brought with them better unobservable qualities than illiterate individuals. 
44 The result is robust to the inclusion of year of departure, and birth cohort of the servant 
(constructed as year of departure minus age of the servant). On the distinction between selection 
and compensating differentials, see, for instance, Goddeeris, “Compensating Differentials.” 
45 Pitman, Development, p. 52. Continental colonies are believed to have provided better oppor-
tunities than West Indies for talented individuals. Smith noted that in continental colonies: “there 
was always a scarcity of labor; always land to be had; always a decent livelihood to be won by those 
who had the qualities necessary to win it. Thus the freed servant with his new clothes and his small 
stock of corn need never have lacked for employment. If he desired land and independence he could 
acquire them in time, even if not immediately on his freedom” (Colonists, p. 293).
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 In terms of selection patterns over observable characteristics, our analysis 
shows (as reported in Tables 1 and 2, column 1) that servants who were 
more skilled (defined as carpenters, blacksmiths, spinsters, weavers, and 
shoemakers) were more likely to move to America’s mainland. In the case of 
the London sample this result is in contrast with that reported by Galenson: 
according to his analysis skilled servants were more likely to migrate to the 
West Indies.
46
 The reason for this difference lies both on the definition of 
skill and on the different methodologies employed: whereas Galenson com-
putes the rough proportion of skilled servants in each colonial destination, 
we control in our regression for other servants’ personal characteristics. 
 However, both Galenson’s analysis and ours suggest that individuals 
who could sign their names were more likely to migrate to the West In-
dies rather than to the mainland.
47
 It is interesting to notice that the selection over unobservable charac-
teristics had a larger effect on the length of servitude than the ability to 
sign or occupation.
48
 This may either suggest the limited information 
contained in the observable variables as measures of education and 
skills or reflect the relative importance of characteristics such as health 
and physical strength that we cannot currently observe and measure. 
Returns to Human Capital 
 Galenson estimates returns to human capital in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries by joining observations for the West Indies and the 
                                                                                                                                           
Hector St. John de Crevecoeur, in his Letters from American Farmer published in 1782, 
writes that: “there is room for every body, in America. Has he any particular talent, or industry? 
he exerts it in order to procure a livelihood, and it succeeds . . . Is he a laborer, sober and indus-
trious? he need not go many miles, nor receive many informations before he will be hired, well 
fed at the table of his employer, and paid four or five times more than he can get in Europe” 
(Smith, Colonists, p. 292). 
According to Smith, West Indian colonies “presented no such satisfactory prospects. Except-
ing Jamaica they were all of small size, and it was not long before the land was taken up.” Ser-
vants to the West Indies were described as “Artificers and Laborers that come from Europe, that 
soon grow lazy and Indolent.” They were “Runagadoes and a loose sort of people” (Pitman, 
Development, p. 54). The English governor commented that a servant arriving to the West In-
dies were “a lazy useless sort of people who come cheap and serve for deficiencies and their 
hearts are not with us” (Pitman, Development, p. 54). Smith asserts that “it is plain that no intel-
ligent and informed man or woman would emigrate to the West Indies as a servant after the first 
years of settlements were over . . . No doubt there were some good servants, and some success-
ful careers even in the eighteenth century, but we must look upon the white servant in the West 
Indies generally as being unfortunate individual, prized mainly for the color of his skin, unable 
to find work, apt even to conspire with slaves, a tragic outcast in the colonial world” (Smith, 
Colonists, p. 295). 
46 Galenson, White Servitude, pp. 91–95. 
47 Galenson, White Servitude.
48 The results of the probit estimation are robust to the inclusion of year of departure and birth 
cohort.
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American mainland.
49
 It is implicitly assumed that the determinants of 
servitude duration are the same in both locations. Our econometric analy-
sis of equation 2 reveals that the returns to human capital differ across co-
lonial destinations. In particular, during the period covered by our analy-
sis, age was on average more rewarded in the mainland than in the West 
Indies. Servants’ skills were more important determinants of the servitude 
duration in mainland colonies than in the West Indies, especially in the 
eighteenth century. Servants who were occupied in the Old World in 
more skilled occupations as carpenters, blacksmiths and spinsters, served 
about three months less than other servants in the mainland, but got simi-
lar terms in the West Indies. Women appeared to have been more valued 
in the mainland than they were in the West Indies.
50
 Our results are consistent across the seventeenth- and eighteenth-
century samples. In both samples we find compensating differentials 
such that, abstracting from personal characteristics, servitude was 
longer in the mainland compared to the West Indies. Women received a 
shorter period of servitude in the mainland in both the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. In the seventeenth century, age was more valued in 
the mainland colonies than in the West Indies, but in the eighteenth cen-
tury this gap disappeared. 
 Notice that our estimators of the determinants of servitude duration 
are not directly comparable with Galenson’s.
51
 In particular, Galenson 
analyzes a pooled regression and places fixed effects on a thin selection 
of colonial destinations to measure compensating differentials.
52
 In our 
analysis the colonial destination is an endogenous variable, and thus it is 
not taken as given. In order to have a more powerful test of selection, 
we group the destinations in two broader categories: West Indies and 
American mainland.
53
 In our analysis the compensating differentials on 
colonial destinations can be measured by looking at the differences in 
the constants of the two human capital evaluation equations. Another 
difference between our analysis and Galenson’s is that whereas Galen-
son has dummy variables for each age group, we introduce a linear rela-
tionship between the servitude’s duration and age (results are robust for 
49 Galenson, White Servitude, pp. 104–05.  
50 Galenson suggests two possible reasons for the wage premium received by women. The 
first is that the demand for them was higher due to shortage of wives for colonists (women con-
stituted less than 6 percent of emigrants in this sample), and the second is that women might 
have been more productive in certain household jobs (such as nursing and cooking) that were 
demanded by colonists. 
51 Galenson, White Servitude, pp. 104–05.  
52 The subdivision that Galenson makes of colonial destinations is the following: Antigua, 
Barbados, Jamaica, Other West Indies, Maryland, Virginia, Other mainland. 
53 In another specification, we divide American mainland between Northern colonies and 
Southern colonies. Our results are robust to this specification. 
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including age squared). Despite the differences, our results of the esti-
mation of the returns to human capital are qualitatively similar to 
Galenson’s. That is, in both colonial destinations and in both the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries, we find that older servants had to serve 
a shorter period to repay their debt, women served shorter periods than 
men, and whereas literate individuals served a shorter period in the sev-
enteenth century, literacy did not have a substantial effect on servitude 
duration in the eighteenth century. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 During the seventeenth century, the West Indian colonies were con-
sidered the richest regions of the Americas. At the beginning of the 
eighteenth century, Barbados’s per capita income was 50 percent higher 
than the per capita income of the American mainland.
54
 By the begin-
ning of the nineteenth century, however, the situation was reversed with 
the mainland colonies overtaking the Caribbean colonies. 
 The current research attempting to explain this different patterns of 
economic development has focused on the role of factor endowments 
and institutions. The debate has concentrated on which of the two fac-
tors has played a more important role. One perspective emphasizes that 
geography is the principal factor determining economic development.
55
A second perspective lays emphasizes that institutions are the determi-
nants of long run economic development.
56
 The geographic and institu-
tional views are not mutually exclusive: geographical location can 
shape institutions, which, in turn, affect economic performance. In the 
context of the British colonies in the New World, Stanley Engerman 
and Kenneth Sokoloff describe how the different geographical envi-
ronments of the American colonies, by favoring one type of crop over 
another, determined the degree of inequality displayed by each colonial 
society and the quality of institutions constituted.
57
 In contrast, by emphasizing the different quality of human capital ar-
riving in various colonies, this article points out the possible importance 
of migrants’ human capital in explaining the different patterns of eco-
54 Engerman and Sokoloff, “Institutions.” 
55 Diamond, “Guns”; Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger, “Geography”; and Sachs, “Tropical Un-
derdevelopment.” 
56 North, Structure; North, Summerhill, and Weingast, “Order”; Hall and Jones, “Why Do 
Some Countries”; Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, “Colonial Origins” and “Reversal”; 
Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson and Thaicharoen, “Institutional Causes”; and Rodrick, Subrama-
niam and Trebbi, “Institution Rule.” 
57 Engerman and Sokoloff, “Factor Endowment,” “Institutions,” and “Colonialism.” Acemo-
glu, Robinson, Johnson, “Colonial Origins” and “Reversal,” also account for the effects of ge-
ography on institutions. 
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nomic development in the two regions.
58
 More specifically, our analysis 
indicates that both in the seventeenth and in the eighteenth centuries, mi-
grants to the West Indies were negatively selected and migrants to the 
mainland were positively selected in terms of their unobservable charac-
teristics such as ability, motivation, ambition, physical strength and 
health. These features were associated with half a year reduction of servi-
tude in the mainland and half a year increase of servitude in the West In-
dies. If the type of destination selectivity by unobserved (to us) human 
capital characteristics that we found for indentured servants can be gener-
alized to other migrants, then this process may have contributed to the 
relative difference in economic development across regions in the Ameri-
cas. In this sense, our analysis provides further support to the work of 
Glaeser et al., who have studied economic growth performance for a set 
of developed and developing countries between 1870 and 2000 and have 
shown that human capital is a fundamental determinant of the develop-
ment of good institutions and a strong predictor of economic growth.
59
 Although the extent and size of the importance of human capital in ex-
plaining the different patterns of economic development in the two re-
gions is a topic for future research, we suggest here three possible chan-
nels through which human capital may have affected the divergence 
between the economic development of the mainland and the West Indies. 
 First, human capital and education have a direct impact on economic 
growth and an indirect impact on economic development through their 
effect on institutions.
60
 The only observable measures of skill that sur-
vived to our times are whether or not a servant could sign his contract 
and his occupation. The unobservable qualities detected by our analysis 
capture aspects of servants’ education and general skills observed by the 
master that could have an important influence on economic activities. 
Under this perspective, better unobservable characteristics might have 
affected differently the economic growth and the development of insti-
tutions of the West Indies and the mainland. 
 Second, as already discussed, health may be an important part of the 
unobservable characteristics in our analysis. Recent research suggests 
that between 10 percent and 29 percent of the share of the actual cross 
58 Our analysis does not reveal whether good servants may have been attracted to the 
mainland because of its geography and natural endowment or because the mainland already had 
better institutions early on. Nevertheless, given our findings, the various explanations of the di-
vergence of the two regions should take into account the divergence in the quality of human 
capital these regions attracted. 
59 Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, “Do Institutions.” 
60 For the direct impact, see Becker, Murphy, and Tamura, “Human Capital”; Galor and Weil. 
“Population”; Lucas, “On the Mechanism”; and Mankiw, Romer, and Weil, “Contribution.” For 
the indirect impact, see Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, “Do Institutions.”  
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country variance in log-income per workers is explained by variation of 
health.
61
 It is reasonable to conjecture that similar results would hold in 
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century economies mainly characterized by 
agricultural production, where the health of human actors played an im-
portant role in determining performance. 
 Third, the unobservable characteristics may consist of servants’ en-
trepreneurial skills, which can contribute to facilitate the adoption of 
new technologies and the construction of good institutions. Starting 
from the work of Lowell Ragatz, an important stream of historiography 
on the British Caribbean colonies depicts the West Indies as a techno-
logically conservative environment.
62
 Planters were overcommitted to 
crops that exhausted the soil, and they would not adopt best practice 
techniques when available. Many of them did not live any more in the 
islands and left the management of the plantations to incapable and dis-
honest managers. Historians also recognized the West Indies as a sys-
tem incapable of organizing institutions that contributed to economic 
growth.
63
 In particular it was noticed that being “the white settlers, 
mostly young male, and drawn from a low grade set of people,” with 
only a few gentlemen leaders and “no substantial number of those mid-
dling Englishmen and Chesapeake societies” constructed bad institu-
tions and a general lifestyle that lacked moral and intellectual values. 
The extent of the failure of West Indian planters is still an object of de-
bate, but the historiography on the matter points out that Caribbean 
colonies were an environment technologically more conservative than 
the mainland colonies.
64
 In contrast, American mainland colonies had an environment more 
receptive of technology adoption. Alan Olmstead and Paul Rhode, for 
instance, show how cotton planters in the early nineteenth century were 
actively engaged in matching the technology and the environment.
65
They were engaged in systematic research for better seed varieties ca-
pable of producing high crops yields. This activity was conducted by 
the planters themselves and required an enormous amount of curiosity, 
motivation, and entrepreneurial skills.
66
61 Shastry and Weil, “How Much”; and Weil, “Accounting for the Effect.” 
62 Ragatz, Fall.
63 Bridenbaugh and Bridenbaugh, No Peace; and Dunn, “Sugar.” 
64 For a re-evaluation of the role of the planters in the West Indies see Green, “Planter”; 
Sheridan, Sugar; and Ward, “Profitability.” 
65 Olmstead and Rhode, “Wait a Cotton Pickin’ Minute!” 
66 Notice, however, that this example may be a consequence of the good people arriving a 
century earlier, or simply another outcome of whatever it was that made good people want to go 
to the mainland. 
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Appendix: Variable Definitions 
Variable  Description 
Gender  Woman = 1; Man = 0 
Ability to write  Sign = 1; Mark = 0 
Winter, spring, summer, fall  Indicated season = 1; otherwise = 0 
American colonies   
 Mainland  Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New York, New England, Georgia, 
Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia 
 West Indies  Antigua, Barbados, Jamaica, St. Christopher, Santa Lucia 
English counties   
 Northern  Yorkshire, Cheshire, Northumberland, Cumberland, 
Westmorland, Durham, Lancashire, Derbyshire, 
Nottinghamshire
 North Central  Northamptonshire, Leicestershire, Norfolk, Rutland, 
Hintingtonshire, Lincolnshire 
 Central  Buckinghamshire, Norfolk, Suffolk, Cambridgeshire, Surrey, 
Bedfordshire, Middlesex, Kent, Hertfordshire, Warwickshire, 
Essex, Oxfordshire, Berkshire 
 Western  Gloucestershire, Shropshire, Herefordshire, Wales, 
Staffordshire, Worcestershire 
 Southern  Dorset, Cornwall, Hampshire, Sussex, Somerset, Wiltshire, 
Devonshire
“Skilled” occupations  Carpenter, blacksmith, spinster, weaver, shoemaker = 1; 
otherwise = 0 
No Occupation  No occupation indicated = 1; otherwise = 0 
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